Enhancing Fiscal Stabilizers -- an IMF Staff Position Note
Posted by Michel Lazare
The global financial crisis has, inter alia, resulted in renewed discussions on the merits of fiscal policy, be discretionary fiscal policy or automatic stabilizers. While fiscal policy can be useful, especially when the financial crisis hinders effectiveness of monetary policy, discretionary fiscal policy can present some shortcomings; it can presents implementation lags and is not automatically reversed when the economic cycle improves. In this context, letting automatic fiscal stabilizers play is tempting, but these stabilizers will only make a useful contribution to stabilizing demand, if they are sizable.
However as noted by our colleagues from the IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department, Thomas Baunsgaard and Steven A. Symansky, "stabilizers are by-products of choices regarding fiscal policy and institutions that are not focused on macroeconomic stabilization. The automatic stabilizers depend on the size of government and the cyclical responsiveness of the tax system—a rule of thumb is that the size of the stabilizers approximately equals the share of government in the economy times the output gap. In turn, the size of government and the design of the tax system reflect societal, philosophical, and political views on the role of the state, equity, and social safety nets. Increases in government size beyond a certain level may also weaken economic efficiency. An important policy question is, therefore, how the automatic stabilizers can be increased without raising the size of government."
The IMF has just published the result of their work in a new Staff Position Note (SPN) on Automatic Fiscal Stabilizers: How Can They Be Enhanced Without Increasing the Size of Government?. In this work, Baunsgaard and Symansky argue that automatic stabilizers can indeed be increased without raising the size of the government.
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