Towards a Principal-Agent Based Typology of Risks in Public-Private Partnerships
Posted by Luc Leruth
This IMF Working Paper (jointly written with André de Palma and Guillaume Prunier, two co-authors from the “Ecole Polytechnique” in France) uses the Principal-Agent framework and the theory of incentives to derive a typology of risks in public-private partnerships (PPPs or P3s). We analyze the significant increase in the demand for the provision of public services through instruments combining public and private money (such as PPPs). We describe these arrangements and discuss the implications of our approach in terms of identifying risks that are often overlooked before turning to the optimal risk-sharing between the public and private partners, in particular with respect to information asymmetries in risk perceptions. This allows us to propose a typology of risks where both internal risks (the risks associated with the contract) and external risks (those associated with the project) are considered.






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