Posted by Holger van Eden
Fiscal Responsibility Laws (FRL) are presently being developed or considered in countries as diverse as Mongolia, Jamaica, Romania, Ghana, and The Maldives. In Germany, while the country already functions within the Maastricht framework – which has been put in a more accommodating stance in the present crisis – a return to a more restrictive fiscal policy path has recently been enshrined into the Constitution. Many larger emerging market and developing economies –Brazil, India, Argentina, Nigeria – have introduced some form of fiscal responsibility legislation in the past years. Some of these laws focus on a concrete set of numerical fiscal policy rules, i.e. a maximum deficit, debt or expenditure growth rule, others are more focused on enhancing fiscal transparency and accountability.
The repeated fiscal problems that these countries have faced, are no doubt a major contributor to these legislative initiatives. The present financial crisis seems also to have stimulated the interest in FRLs considerably. Perhaps because countries with fiscal responsibility laws seem to have fared better, and kept their deficits better in check than the countries without such laws. At present the deficits in the Eurozone are about half the size of those in the Anglo-Saxon world. Further research on this hypothesis is needed, and in the past evidence has been inconclusive,[1] but quite a few countries seem to have already made the decision that FRLs are helpful in supporting fiscal discipline.
The argument against fiscal responsibility laws has always been that a fiscal framework doesn’t substitute for “enlightened”, or first-best fiscal policy. Fiscal frameworks are always somewhat crude and 2nd best because: (a) they are developed to withstand numerous types of shocks to the economy, and (b) they need to be simple and straightforward to be politically effective. Most FRLs would not guide fiscal policy as well as a “first best” policy makers. Nominal deficit rules, for example, ignore the desired counter-cyclicality of fiscal policy. For these reasons, economists have often disliked FRLs. In real life, however, fiscal frameworks usually do not have to compete against the best fiscal policy or “enlightened” policy makers. The reality of fiscal policy is that there is a strong political and institutional bias for unduly loose fiscal policy. Thus fiscal responsibility laws have to compete, against 3rd or fourth best competitors, and compared to these, fiscal responsibility laws can be quite successful.
Emerging practice reveals a number of rules-of thumb for developing FRLs.
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